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Abstract—Malware imposes tremendous threats to computer users nowadays. Since signature-based malware detection methods are
neither effective nor efficient to identify new malware, many machine learning-based methods have been proposed. A common
disadvantage of existing machine learning methods is that they are not based on understanding the full semantic meaning of assembly
code of an executable. They rather use short assembly code fragments, because assembly code is usually too long to be modelled in
its entirety. Another disadvantage is that those methods have either inferior performance or bad interpretability. To overcome these
challenges, we propose an Interpretable MAware Detector (I-MAD), which achieves state-of-the-art performance on static malware
detection with excellent interpretability. It integrates a hierarchical Transformer network that can understand assembly code at the basic
block, function, and executable level. It also integrates our novel interpretable feed-forward neural network to provide interpretations for
its detection results by pointing out the impact of each feature with respect to the prediction. Experiment results show that our model
significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art static malware detection models and presents meaningful interpretations.
Index Terms—Malware detection, deep learning, interpretability
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MALWARE is software written to steal credentials ofcomputer users, damage computer systems, and en-
crypt documents for ransom, among other nefarious goals.
Since the Internet has become an integral part of people’s
life, the large volume of malware spreading on it imposes
tremendous threats to billions of netizens. Recognizing mal-
ware samples downloaded by legitimate users in a timely
manner is thus of crucial importance for their protection.
Signature-based malware detection methods are widely
used in antivirus products [1]. With the signatures extracted
by malware analysts, known malware samples or some of
their variants can be precisely recognized. However, with
obfuscation techniques or even a change of compiler, it is
easy to create variants of known malware that perform the
same attack, but with literally different executable code. As
a result, the previously crafted signatures can no longer
recognize them [2]. Furthermore, signature-based detection
is also ineffective to detect new and unseen malware in most
cases. There is thus a pressing need to create an intelligent
malware detection system that can capture new malware or
variants of known malware.
For this purpose, many machine learning-based mal-
ware analysis methods have been proposed [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7]. They have several advantages over signature-
based methods. First, they can automatically learn common
patterns of malware from the feature space that have bet-
ter generalization ability than manually crafted signatures.
Second, machine learning models do not classify samples
based on the existence of individual signatures, but on a
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comprehensive analysis of the combination of patterns they
identify from the feature space [8]. Third, machine learning
models do not require human experts to examine individual
malware samples. They thus extensively save human labor.
Nonetheless, there are two major limitations in most
machine learning-based malware detection models. One is
their lack of interpretability. Linear models, such as logistic
regression and Naive Bayes, are very simple and have
excellent interpretability, but have inferior classification per-
formance. The machine learning models that achieve state-
of-the-art classification performance are therefore not lin-
ear models [9], [10]. The other limitation is that existing
machine learning-based methods for malware detection are
not based on understanding the semantic meaning of the
assembly code of an executable. It is quite challenging to
fully model the assembly code of an executable because it is
very long. An executable of 1 MB usually has hundreds of
thousands of instructions. No effective training approaches
have been proposed to train such long sequences. One com-
mon practice for using assembly code as features is to split
the assembly code of an executable into short fragments,
i.e., n-grams, of which the term frequency (TF) or (term
frequency–inverse document frequency) TF-IDF are used as
features [3], [4], [11], [12], [13]. However, with this approach,
the overall semantic meaning of the executable is inevitably
lost. Another practice is to match assembly functions of
unknown executables to functions of known malware. The
matching is not based on the semantic meaning of the
function code, but on the literal similarity [14], [15], [16]. As
a result, it still tends to miss the variants of malware that are
obfuscated and cannot capture new malware. Developing a
model that can understand the full semantic meaning of
assembly code and simulate the procedure of how a human
analyzes an executable is the key to improve the generability
of an intelligent malware detection model.
Deep learning models have achieved great success in
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2understanding natural language when properly trained on
large datasets [17], [7], [18]. In the field of natural language
processing (NLP), the sizes of the corpora are usually very
large, thanks to the popularity of the Internet [7]. However,
most of them are unlabeled text, which makes it challenging
to train deep learning models on them and transfer the
knowledge to specific NLP tasks. Thus, researchers propose
several pre-training methods to train deep learning models
on unlabeled corpora and then fine-tune the parameters
of the models for specific NLP tasks [19], [20], [17], [7],
[18], [21], [22], [23]. Experiment results show that those
pre-training methods greatly improve the performance of
deep learning models on the downstream tasks. However, it
should be noted that the successful applications are mainly
on short text, i.e., sentence-level tasks, such as paraphrase
detection, sentiment analysis [17], [7], or at short-document
level, such as reading comprehension and automatic sum-
marization of news articles [22]. No evidence shows the
application of deep learning on long text-related tasks, such
as the summarization of multiple documents, novellas, or
novels, can achieve satisfactory results.
Although deep learning models are good at understand-
ing semantics, it is challenging to apply them to under-
standing the semantic meaning of the assembly code of an
executable as successfully as for natural language. Assembly
code can be obtained by disassembling a target executable
to show its logic. It is comprised of assembly instructions
such as MOV EAX, [EBP+4], and PUSH ECX. The role of
instructions in assembly language is analogous to the role of
words in natural language. The difficulty in training a deep
learning model to understand the semantic meaning of the
assembly code of an executable partially comes from the fact
that it is usually very long. This is analogous to applying
deep learning on long natural language text. In addition,
assembly language and natural language have different
characteristics in their basic units. Each instruction contains
one opcode and zero or up to two operands which is quite
different from a word. Usually, multiple instructions are
used to fulfill one purpose (e.g., memory copy, completing if
statement). Therefore, the function of an instruction heavily
depends on its context. Although the meaning of a word can
be contextual, it also has relatively constant meanings.
Despite the fact that assembly code of an executable
is usually very long, it has an innate hierarchical struc-
ture: instructions forming basic blocks, basic blocks form-
ing assembly functions, and assembly functions forming
the ensemble of assembly code (i.e., the full logic) of an
executable. The lengths of basic blocks, assembly functions,
and the ensemble of the assembly code of an executable in
terms of its direct sub-unit are not that long. Based on this
characteristic, we propose a hierarchical Transformer (H-Tran)
network. It contains three customized Transformer networks
in a hierarchy to understand the semantic meaning of the
assembly code of an executable at different levels: basic
block, assembly function, and executable level. Its core,
Transformer, was proposed by Vaswani et al. [24] for machine
translation in 2017. It has received a lot of attention due
to its ability to model the semantic meanings of items
in a sequence based on their context. Many breakthrough
papers in the deep learning field choose Transformer as their
core to be pre-trained with their proposed methods and
Table 1
Sample result of our malware detection and its interpretation which
include the 5 factors that contribute most to the prediction and the most
related assembly functions.
File: 05c199.exe
Prediction: malicious
Confidence: 100%
Primary factors leading to the prediction of malicious
Feature description Feature value Impact
Assembly code N/A 14.56
Number of PE imports 8 5.12
Major operating system version 1 1.49
Frequency of the string "Sleep" 1 0.82
Frequency of the string ".data" 1 0.59
Most influential assembly functions
sub_401010
sub_4010AE
then fine-tuned for downstream tasks. They achieved sig-
nificantly new state-of-the-art performance on their down-
stream tasks [17], [18], [7], [23].
We propose two approaches to pre-train the customized
Transformers at the bottom level and middle level respec-
tively to understand the semantic meanings of basic blocks
and assembly functions. The vector representation of the
assembly code of an executable is generated by the top-
level Transformer of H-Tran. In addition, features extracted
from other parts of the executables are of crucial importance
when the assembly code of the payload is encrypted. There-
fore, multiple features are used as the inputs to our pro-
posed interpretable feed-forward neural network (IFFNN)
to perform malware detection. As its name shows, our pro-
posed IFFNN can provide interpretation for its prediction
results. An example of the prediction and its interpretation
is given in Table 1. It shows the detection results of a
target file, the confidence of the result, the main factors, i.e.,
features, that lead to the prediction and the most related
assembly functions.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
1) This paper is among the first to propose a deep
learning model to understand the full semantic
meaning of the assembly code of an executable for
malware detection.
2) We propose two pre-training tasks to train the
bottom-level and middle-level components of our
H-Tran respectively to understand the semantic
meaning of assembly code at basic block and func-
tion level.
3) We improve the way to use printable string features
and PE import features from previous works with
our insights towards malware.
4) We propose an interpretable feed-forward neural
network as the classification module of our I-MAD
model. It allows I-MAD to interpret why it classifies
an executable to be malicious or benign by pointing
out which features are the main factors leading to
the results. Our attribution mechanism shows that
the vector representation of assembly code learned
by the H-Tran and our improved way to represent
the features are highly effective for malware de-
3tection. Furthermore, the interpretable feed-forward
neural network can be applied to general classifica-
tion tasks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. Section 3 formulates the formal
problem definition. Section 4 provides the details of our
proposed method. Section 5 presents the experiment results
and analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Malware Detection
Malware detection fall into two categories: static and
dynamic methods. Static methods examine the static content
of an executable, while dynamic methods run an executable
and analyze its behavior. The most common features used in
static methods include binary sequences [25], [26], [12], [6],
assembly code sequences [3], [4], [11], [12], [13], numerical
PE header features [12], [5], [6], PE imports [25], [5], [6], and
printable strings [25], [27], [6]. The way most researchers
use binary sequences or assembly code sequences is to
cut them into n-gram pieces to form features [25], [26],
[3], [4], [11], [12], [13], [6]. Consequently, the full logic of
the original executable is scattered into fragments, making
the comprehension of the whole semantic meaning of the
executable nearly impossible. Thus, this approach inevitably
introduces confusion in malware detection. There are also
instance-based detection methods which identify malware
by checking whether an executable contains assembly func-
tions of known malware [14], [12], [16].
Dynamic methods run a target executable in an isolated
environment, e.g., a virtual machine or an emulator, and
extract features, such as the memory image of the exe-
cutable [28], [29], [30], the executed instructions [31], [4],
[11], [12], and the invoked system calls or behaviors derived
from them [32], [33], [12], [29], [27], [13], [30].
Both static and dynamic methods have their advantages
and disadvantages. Compared with static methods, dy-
namic methods provide more abundant and direct informa-
tion. Even though both static and dynamic methods extract
system calls as features, the analyst can always see the pa-
rameters passed to those invoked system calls with dynamic
methods, which is not the case for static methods [32], [29],
[27], [13]. Moreover, when a malware file is packed, or is
polymorphic or metamorphic, the payload probably cannot
be seen with static methods. Yet, to perform its malicious
action, it has to reveal the payload during execution [32].
This gives another advantage of dynamic over static meth-
ods. However, it does not mean that static methods cannot
capture malware with those mechanisms, because their use
is suspicious and can be detected. Previous works on static
malware detection show that when analyzing an unknown
executable from multiple feature scopes, it is hard for the
malware to evade the detection [12], [27]. On the other hand,
one serious shortcoming of dynamic methods is that when
a malware sample finds that its running is monitored, it
will not perform its malicious action to evade the detection.
Therefore, dynamic methods will fail to recognize that it
is malware [32], [2]. In addition, dynamically analyzing an
executable is quite time-consuming. To avoid these disad-
vantages of dynamic methods, we propose a static malware
detection approach in this paper.
2.2 Transformer
As programming language and natural language share
some similar characteristics, the experience in modeling
the latter can be customized to model the former. Before
Vaswani et al. [24] proposed the deep learning model
known as Transformer, most state-of-the-art neural machine
translation models belonged to the class of attention-based
recurrent neural network (RNN) models. In these models,
an RNN is used to encode the source text and another RNN
with attention mechanism is used to generate the translation
word by word [34], [35]. The attention mechanism is used to
determine the importance of the words in the source text for
generating each translated word. One disadvantage of this
type of model is that the recurrence nature precludes par-
allelism. Another disadvantage is that the attention mecha-
nism assigns only one importance weight to a word in the
source text, so it can just focus on one aspect of the words
in the source text. Transformer addresses both problems
and achieves new state-of-the-art performance on machine
translation by abandoning the RNN and relying only on an
improved attention mechanism [24]. The attention mech-
anism in Transformer is referred to as multi-head attention,
which allows multiple attention weights to be assigned to
each item. Each weight corresponds to one aspect of an item,
thus their attention mechanism is more powerful than the
previously proposed attention mechanism in its modeling
ability [24]. As there is no RNN in it, the recurrence nature
of the encoder does not exist anymore, which tremendously
increases the computation efficiency. Since 2017, researchers
see the potential of Transformer and propose their own ways
to pre-train Transformer on unlabeled corpora that are abun-
dant and then fine-tune it for downstream NLP tasks. They
constantly achieve significantly better results than previous
methods on many NLP tasks [17], [7], [18], [23]. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to customize multiple
Transformers in a hierarchy to understand assembly code for
malware detection.
2.3 Interpretable Networks
In most cases, deep learning models are proposed to
achieve the best performance on a certain research prob-
lem without considering its interpretability. However, inter-
pretability is very important for the applications in some
fields. In healthcare, the rationale of the decisions or predic-
tions made by deep learning models and the contributions
of different factors leading to them need to be validated by
a doctor as it concerns patients’ health [36], [37], [10]. In
cybersecurity, it is also instructive for system administrators
or malware analysts to know the reasons for which the intel-
ligent malware detection systems make the judgments [10].
Shicke et al. [37] criticize that deep learning models are
hard to interpret. Therefore, linear models dominate applied
clinical informatics. They also reviewed some attempts to
make deep learning models interpretable. Choi et al. [9]
propose the interpretable network RETAIN for predictions
in healthcare. They use two attention-based RNN networks
4Figure 1. An overview of our I-MAD model.
to compute the importance of each feature to a certain
output result, so it can be seen as a softmax regression
with dynamically computed weights and thus has excellent
interpretability. Inspired by their method, we propose to use
a feed-forward neural network to simulate a logistic regres-
sion with dynamically computed weight of each feature to
achieve the same interpretability as logistic regression while
keeping the performance of non-linear models.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we define some important concepts,
followed by the definition of the target research problem.
An assembly instruction is a sequence of one opcode
and two operands: ins = 〈Opcode,Operand1, Operand2〉.
Empty operands are substituted by the special token EMPTY.
All opcodes and operands form a set, and each of them
is assigned an index number. Thus, one instruction can
be abstracted as a sequence of three integers, where each
integer represents an index of an opcode or operand. A
basic block is a sequence of assembly instructions b =
〈ins1, ins2, ..., insn〉, i.e., a sequence of sequences that con-
tain three ordered integers. An assembly function is a set of
basic blocks f = {b1, b2, ..., bm}. It should be noted that
it is not a sequence, since there is no order in them. Their
address in an executable can be arbitrarily changed without
affecting the logic, as long as they are connected in the
same way. Even though we do not explicitly express the
connection information, we do not lose this information,
because some instructions of the basic blocks, such as call,
jump, etc., implicitly capture the connection information.
Two assembly functions are clones of each other if they
generate the exact same outputs for all possible inputs.
The ensemble of assembly code (i.e., the full logic) of an
executable is a set of assembly functions {f1, f2, ..., fo}. The
order of the functions in the executable is determined by the
compiler and does not contain additional information. The
formal definition of our target research problem malware
detection is given below.
Definition 1 (Malware Detection). Consider a collection of ex-
ecutables E and a collection of labels L that show the executables
in E are benign or malicious. Let t be an unknown executable that
t /∈ E. The malware detection problem is to build a classification
model M based on E and L such that M can be used to determine
whether the executable t is benign or malicious.
4 METHODOLOGY
Our malware detection model I-MAD includes an H-Tran
to learn a vector to represent the semantic meaning of the
assembly code of a target executable and an IFFNN that
takes the vector representing the assembly code of a target
executable and vectors representing other features as its
inputs to produce an interpretable detection result. Figure 1
is an overview of our malware detection model. In this
section, we describe the customization of each Transformer
in our proposed H-Tran as well as their training procedure,
the other features we use, and the novel IFFNN and how we
use it to interpret the detection results.
4.1 Encoder of Transformer
The core of each component of our H-Tran is a cus-
tomized encoder of the Transformer network. The input to
the Transformer encoder is a sequence of integers: x =
〈x1, x2, ..., xn〉, and the output is a sequence of vectors:
y = 〈y1, y2, ..., yn〉. Each input integer represents the index
of an item in a set. Each output vector yi represents the
contextual semantic meaning of the corresponding item xi.
The architecture of the encoder of Transformer is shown in
Figure 2. First, each input item xi is mapped to a vector
representation ei ∈ Rdmodel where dmodel is the specified
dimension. ei is the summation of two vectors: one is the
embedding of the item representing the semantic meaning
of the item without any context; the other is the vector repre-
senting the position information, indicated by i, of the item
in the sequence. So, ei contains both the semantic meaning
of xi and its position information. The vector sequence
e = 〈e1, e2, ..., en〉 forms a matrix of the shape Rn×dmodel ,
which is then fed to a stack of N identical neural network
layers. These layers have the following properties:
• They are symmetric to the input vectors, which means
that if we change the order of the input vectors, the order
of the output vectors is also changed accordingly, but
their values are not affected.
5Figure 2. The architecture of the encoder of Transformer.
• The N layers have the exact components, but different
parameter values.
• The input and output of each layer have the same shape
Rn×dmodel , which is the same as the shape of e, i.e., n
vectors of the dimension dmodel. The input of the j-th
layer is the output of the (j − 1)-th layer, except that the
input to the first layer is e.
Each layer mainly contains a multi-head attention sub-
layer and a point-wise, fully-connected sub-layer. The multi-
head attention sub-layer makes the vectors from the lower
layer interact with each other from multiple aspects, so that
its output is the vectors representing the contextual semantic
meanings of the items. The point-wise, fully-connected sub-
layer generates higher-level features based on the contextual
representations of items. There is also a residual connection
and layer normalization following each of those two sub-
layers, since they can ease the training process of deep
learning models [38], [39].
We refer the readers to the original paper of Transformer
for more details [24]. Next, we introduce the customization
of the encoder of Transformer for our purposes. In the rest
of the paper, we refer to the "encoder of Transformer" as
"Transformer" for simplicity.
Due to the innate hierarchical structure of assembly code
of an executable, i.e., instructions forming basic blocks, basic
blocks forming assembly functions, and assembly functions
forming the full logic of an executable, we customize three
Transformer networks in a hierarchy to learn the semantic
meaning of assembly code at each level.
4.2 Bottom-Level Transformer to Understand Basic
Blocks
The objective of our bottom-level Transformer is to gener-
ate a vector representing the semantic meaning of a basic
block with the sequence of its instructions as the input.
The standard Transformer cannot directly fulfill this purpose
which can be seen from the formats of its input and output.
The output of Transformer is n vectors representing the
semantic meaning of each item in the sequence. However,
in our case, we need one vector representing the semantic
meaning of the whole sequence. The input of Transformer is
a sequence of n integers, while the actual input in this case
is a sequence of instructions, each of which is a sequence of
three integers. Therefore, some customization is necessary.
First, we modify the input embedding layer. Since both the
embedding of an instruction insi and its positional encod-
ing should have dimensions of dmodel, we make the embed-
dings of the opcode and operands dmodel/3 dimensions and
use the concatenation of them as the embedding of the in-
struction, which is then added with the positional encoding
to form ei. This is the customization at the input layer. For
the output, we need one vector from the output vectors to
capture the semantic meaning of the entire sequence. Yet, all
of the n instructions in a basic block are equally important. It
is inappropriate to simply pick the output vector of any one
of them to be the representation of the whole basic block.
Therefore, we insert a special instruction at the beginning
of every basic block (BEG,EMPTY,EMPTY ) to the
input and train the output vector of this special instruction
to represent the semantic meaning of the basic block. To
train this customized Transformer, we propose the Masked
Assembly Model task.
Definition 2 (Masked Assembly Model). Let (b, ins) be
a basic block and assembly instruction pair. Consider a set
of basic block and assembly instruction pairs B. For each
pair (b, ins) ∈ B, there is one mask instruction m =
[MASK_OPC,EMPTY,EMPTY ] in b that should origi-
nally be ins. Let t be a target basic block that is not in any pair
of B, and one of its instructions is replaced by m. The Masked
Assembly Model task is to build a classification model M based
on B to predict the original instruction of t replaced by m.
This task is inspired by the Masked Language Model task
proposed by Devlin et al. [7]. In that task, the authors mask
random words from sentences and use Transformer to predict
the masked words based on the contextual words in the
sentences. Their method is to feed the output vector of the
Transformer corresponding to a mask word to an output
softmax over the vocabulary. The prediction requires both
global context and local context. The global context means
the semantic meaning of the whole sentence except the
masked word. The local context means the position of the
masked word and its surrounding words to indicate what
ingredient the missing word should be. As the output vector
corresponding to the masked word is the only information
source for the output layer to make the prediction, it has to
capture both global and local context. This does not fit our
objective, since the output vector should only contain the
semantic meaning of a basic block (i.e., global contextual
information). Therefore, we separate the two kinds of infor-
mation in two vectors: the output vector of the inserted in-
struction (BEG,EMPTY,EMPTY ) containing the global
contextual information and the output vector of the masked
instruction m = [MASK_OPC,EMPTY,EMPTY ] con-
taining the local contextual information. We concatenate
those two vectors to form one vector and feed it to three
feed-forward neural networks with softmax over the whole
6Figure 3. The bottom-level Transformer.
set of opcodes and operands to predict the opcode and
two operands of the original masked instruction. Figure 3
illustrates how we customize the encoder of Transformer for
the Masked Assembly Model task. It should be noted that after
this training step, we only need to keep the customized
Transformer, which generates the vector representing the
semantic meaning of the entire basic block, because the
three feed-forward neural networks to predict the original
masked instruction are not used after the training for the
Masked Assembly Model task.
4.3 Middle-Level Transformer to Understand Assembly
Function
We have introduced the bottom-level Transformer to learn
the vector representation of the semantic meaning of a basic
block. Now, we customize Transformer to learn the vector
representation of the semantic meaning of an assembly
function from the set of vectors representing its basic blocks.
It should be noted that the input is not a sequence of vectors,
but a set of vectors in which the order is unimportant.
The customization involves three steps: 1) we insert one
trainable and randomly initialized vector to the input vector
set for the same reason that we insert a special instruction to
the input of the bottom-level Transformer. Its corresponding
output vector represents the semantic meaning of the as-
sembly function; 2) we abandon the input embedding layer
as the input is already a set of vectors rather than integers;
and 3) the positional encoding is also abandoned as there
is no order in the input. Thus, we directly feed the set of
vectors representing the basic blocks in any order to the
N identical neural network layers. Since those layers are
Figure 4. The middle-level Transformer.
symmetric to the input vectors, irrespective of the order of
the input vectors, the output of the inserted vector stays the
same. Figure 4 depicts the proposed network. To make the
network learn to generate the vector representation of the
semantic meaning of an assembly function as the output of
the inserted vector, we propose to train it with the Assembly
Function Clone Detection task.
Definition 3 (Assembly Function Clone Detection). Let
(f1, f2) be an assembly function pair. Let (f1, f2, l) be a labeled
assembly function pair in which the label l indicates whether
the two assembly functions f1 and f2 are clones of each other.
Consider a collection of labeled assembly function pairs F . Let
p = (f1, f2) be a new function pair that p is not any function
pair in F . The assembly function clone detection task is to build a
classification model M based on F to determine whether the two
functions in p are clones of each other.
The idea is that if the vector representations of assembly
functions can be used to determine whether two functions
are clones of each other, they contain the semantic meaning
of the assembly functions. We train the network to generate
similar vectors in cosine measure for real assembly function
clone pairs and dissimilar vectors for non-clone pairs. The
way we form the function pair dataset is described in
Section 5.
4.4 Top-Level Transformer to Understand Full Logic of
An Executable
With the aforementioned neural network, we represent
each assembly function with a vector. The next step is to
learn one vector representing the full logic of an executable
based on the vector representations of all its assembly
functions. Technically, this is similar to learning the repre-
sentation of an assembly function from the representations
7of its basic blocks, so the top-level Transformer is a duplicate
of the middle-level Transformer. The top-level Transformer is
fed to the IFFNN for malware detection without other pre-
training task proposed for it.
4.5 Other Features
When malware is packed, or is polymorphic or meta-
morphic, the assembly code of its payload is encrypted and
not statically accessible. Hence, using only assembly code
would fail to identify its malicious purpose. According to
the experience of previous works [12], [27], static analysis
could still be effective because the use of those stealthy
mechanisms could be captured when analyzed from multi-
ple static feature scopes. Below, we describe the three kinds
of features we use and how we improve the way to use
them.
4.5.1 Printable Strings
According to the literature [25], [27], [29], [30], printable
strings are important, because they include runtime-linked
libraries and functions that are commonly used among
malware, registry keys that are commonly used by malware,
system paths, and sometimes the names of user-defined
functions, etc. Hence, we extract printable strings from the
whole byte sequence of an executable. In our algorithm,
a continuous subsequence is a printable string if it satisfies
three conditions: 1) all of its bytes are ASCII characters,
2) it is terminated with a null symbol, and 3) its length
is at least 5 bytes. We count the number of instances of
each printable string in the training set and put the strings
that appear more than a certain threshold, which is 200 in
our case in the frequent string set. Their frequencies in an
executable are used as features. This is not new comparing
with previous works. The improvement is that we also use
the number of printable strings that are not in the frequent
string set, i.e., uncommon strings, as a feature, and the total
number of common printable strings in the executable as
another feature. This is based on the intuition that encrypted
malware has more uncommon printable strings and benign
software has more common strings.
4.5.2 PE Imports
PE Imports are dynamically linked libraries and func-
tions shown in the import address table of PE headers. The
imports of an executable often illustrate its behaviors, e.g.,
modify the registry, or hook a procedure. The total number
of imports show whether the executable is hiding its po-
tential behaviors, because abnormally few imports indicate
that runtime linking is largely used or most of its imports
are hidden in encrypted data. Therefore, we compute these
features in the same way as we compute the printable string
features.
4.5.3 PE Header Numerical Features
There are many numerical fields in PE headers that con-
tain information that could form different patterns among
malware and benign software (benignware). Hence, we also
use these values as features.
We concatenate the vector representing the full logic
of an executable vcode, printable string feature vector vstr,
Figure 5. Our proposed IFFNN.
PE header numerical feature vector vnum, and PE import
feature vector vimp to form a vector representation of the ex-
ecutable from multiple scopes v = [vcode, vstr, vnum, vimp].
4.6 Interpretable Feed-Forward Neural Network
Interpretability is an important quality of a machine
learning model for malware detection. Inspired by the
work of Choi et al. [9] which uses two attention-based
RNN networks to form a softmax regression model with
dynamic weights, we propose a novel interpretable feed-
forward neural network (IFFNN) to form a "dynamic logistic
regression" model. Figure 5 illustrates the architecture of the
IFFNN.
Let x ∈ Rm be a feature vector representing a sample.
We first feed it to a normal fully-connected layer:
vh(x) = tanh(W1x+ b1) (1)
where W1 ∈ Rdh×m, b1 ∈ Rdh , and vh(x) ∈ Rdh . Then, we
apply another normal fully-connected layer of which the
output vector has the same dimension as x:
w(x) = tanh(W2vh(x) + b2) (2)
where W2 ∈ Rm×dh , b2 ∈ Rm, and w(x) ∈ Rm. w(x) serves
as a weight vector for each feature in x. The final confidence
that the input sample is positive (in malware detection,
positive means malicious) is calculated as follows:
y = IFFNN(x) = sigmoid(w(x)Tx+ b) (3)
where b ∈ R is a bias term. This is similar to a logistic
regression (i.e., y = sigmoid(wTx + b), where w is a pa-
rameter vector), and the difference is that the weight vector
w(x) is dynamically computed based on x rather than static
parameters. Thus, this network has the same interpretability
as logistic regression, but has the modelling power of a
multi-layer network.
The IFFNN can be used for any binomial classification
task and can be plainly generalized to a "dynamic softmax
regression" model for multinomial classification, as long
as the sample can be represented as a vector with fixed
dimension. The number of hidden layers except the weight
vector layer, i.e., w(x), can also be extended to be more than
one.
We feed v, the feature vector from multiple scopes of an
executable, to the proposed IFFNN to get the confidence y
8Figure 6. The top model for malware detection.
that it is malicious: y = IFFNN(v), which completes the
full network of the top-level model. Figure 6 illustrates this.
4.7 Attribution
For logistic regression: y = sigmoid(wTx + b) =
sigmoid(w1x1 + w2x2 + ... + wmxm + b), where x =
[x1, x2, ..., xm] and w = [w1, w2, ..., wm], the attribution
is simple. Whether feature xj makes the sample positive
depends on the sign of wjxj . If wjxj > 0, xj makes it
positive, and vice versa. The degree of the impact of xj on
y depends on |wjxj |: a large |wjxj | implies a large impact
of xj . For example, if the model predicts a sample to be
positive, the most influential factor that leads to the result is
maxjwjxj . If the model predicts a sample to be negative, the
most influential factor that leads to the result is minjwjxj .
The same idea is applicable to our IFFNN for mal-
ware detection. Its top layer is a logistic regression with
dynamically computed weight: y = sigmoid(w(v)T v) =
sigmoid(w(v)1v1 + w(v)2v2 + ... + w(v)mvm). If |w(v)jvj |
is large and w(v)jvj > 0, feature vj has a great impact
on the prediction of malicious. If |w(v)jvj | is large and
w(v)jvj < 0, feature vj has great impact on the prediction
to benign. For printable string features, PE imports, and PE
header numerical features, each dimension of their vector
representations corresponds to a specific feature. The fea-
tures can be the frequency of a certain string, whether a
certain DLL is imported, the value of a certain numerical
field, etc. By checking its w(v)jvj , we know whether it
makes the executable more likely malicious or benign. For
the vector representing the full logic of an executable: vcode,
each of its dimensions has no specific meaning, but we
can see the impact of the full logic of the executable by
computing the summation of the impact of each dimension
of its vector:
∑
j∈vcode wdet,jvfea,j . If it is positive, from the
perspective of the full logic of an executable, it is considered
malicious, and vice versa.
As vcode is computed by our top-level Transformer-based
network, the attention weights of the multi-head attention
networks indicate the importance of each assembly function
to the output vector. We compute the summed attention
weights of each assembly function towards the output vec-
tor to show which assembly functions are the main factors
that influence the classification results.
4.8 Model Training
To train the bottom-level Transformer, the objective func-
tion is the cross-entropy between the real masked opcode
and operands and the predicted ones. To train the middle-
level Transformer and simultaneously fine-tune the bottom-
level Transformer, the objective function is the mean squared
error between the computed cosine similarity between two
assembly functions and the gold standard ones (i.e., 1 for
clone function pairs, and -1 for non-clone function pairs).
To train the full top-level network, the objective function
is the cross-entropy between the predicted label and gold
standard label of an executable. To ensure that the top-
level Transformer gets sufficient training, we first only train
it without concatenating any other feature, i.e., feed vcode
instead of v to the IFFNN (y = IFFNN(vcode)) and train
it for malware detection. This is in fact the pre-training of
the top-level Transformer. Then, we concatenate vcode with
other features to feed it to the IFFNN (y = IFFNN(v)) and
train it the same way for malware detection. The two lower
level Transformer networks are not fine-tuned when we train
the top-level network. For all the training objectives, we use
Adam [40] with the initial learning rate 1e− 4. We use early
stopping with the validation set to avoid overfitting [41].
5 EXPERIMENTS
The objectives of our experiments are to 1) evaluate the
accuracy of I-MAD for malware detection, 2) compare with
other state-of-the-art static malware detection solutions, and
3) demonstrate the interpretability of I-MAD.
We train and evaluate the models on a server with two
Xeon E5-2697 CPUs, 384 GB memory, and four Nvidia Titan
XP graphics cards. We use PyTorch [42] to implement our
model. We use "pefile"1 library to extract numerical features
from PE headers.
1. https://github.com/erocarrera/pefile
95.1 Datasets and Pre-training
For the two pre-training tasks, we compile several
open source projects with different compilation settings. O-
LLVM2 is an obfuscator of the LLVM compiler that provides
control flow flattening, instruction substitution, and bogus
control flow obfuscation mechanisms. We use O-LLVM to
compile libcrypto, libgmp, libMagickCore, and libtomcrypt with
five different settings: no obfuscation, one of the three
obfuscation mechanisms, all three mechanisms. Thus, for
every assembly function in those projects, we have five
semantically equivalent versions. GCC compiler provides
four different optimization levels (i.e., O0, O1, O2, O3)
to compile projects. We compile busybox, coreutils, libcurl,
libgmp, libtomcrypt, libz, magick, openssl, puttygen, and sqlite3
with GCC at all four optimization levels. Thus, we have
four versions of every function of them. We use IDA Pro3,
a commercial disassembler, to disassemble our compiled
executables and acquire the assembly functions.
We use all the basic blocks of which the lengths are
between 5 to 250 instructions to form our Masked Assem-
bly Model dataset. As a result, it contains 38,427,440 basic
blocks. We use all of them for training and none for testing,
as the purpose of the dataset is to train the bottom-level
Transformer to understand assembly code, and the accuracy
of this task is uninformative.
We use the semantically equivalent but literally different
functions we compiled to form real function clone pairs, and
we randomly pair the same number of functions to be non-
clone function pairs to create the dataset for the Assembly
Function Clone Detection task. We limit the maximum num-
ber of instructions per basic block to be 50 and the maximum
number of block per function to be 50 in this dataset, so that
the memory of our graphics cards can hold the data flowing
in the bottom two-level network. There are 213,656 function
pairs in the training set, 26,898 functions in the validation
set, and 26,746 functions in the test set. Our bottom two-
level networks get a classification accuracy of 91.3% on the
test set. This means that the assembly function represen-
tations it computes and the representations of basic blocks
that are fed to it indeed capture the semantic meanings of
assembly code. We do not elaborate on the experiments for
this task, since it is not the objective task, but rather a task
to pre-train the middle-level Transformer and fine-tune the
bottom-level Transformer.
For malware detection, we collected a dataset containing
4,361 benign and 6,096 malicious executables. There is no
redundancy in the dataset. The benign executables are the
.exe and .dll files from the installation paths of software
programs. The malicious executables are collected from Mal-
Share and VirusShare in 2018. The way we split the dataset
into training set, validation set, and test set is introduced in
the Experiment Setting Subsection.
5.2 Models For Comparison
We implement several state-of-the-art static malware
detection models to compare with our I-MAD model.
• Mosk2008OpBi Moskovitch et al. [3] propose to use
TF or TF-IDF of opcode bi-grams as features and use
2. https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki
3. https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/
document frequency (DF), information gain ratio, or
Fisher score as the criteria for feature selection. They
apply Artificial Neural Networks, Decision Trees,
Naïve Bayes, Boosted Decision Trees, and Boosted
Naïve Bayes as their malware detection models.
• Bald2013Meta Baldangombo et al. [5] propose to ex-
tract multiple raw features from PE headers and use
information Gain and calling frequencies for feature
selection and PCA for dimension reduction. They
apply SVM, J48, and Naïve Bayes as their malware
detection models.
• Saxe15Deep Saxe et al. [6] propose a sophiscated
deep learning model that works on four different
features: byte/entropy histogram features, PE import
features, string 2D histogram features, and PE meta-
data numerical features. We tried to follow the exact
features they extract, but since they did not provide
the exact metadata numerical fields they use, we just
use the same numerical fields of PE headers used in
our model as part of their input.
• Mour2019CNN Mourtaji et al. [43] convert malware
binaries to grayscale images and apply a convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) on malware images for
malware classification. Their CNN network has two
convolutional layers followed by a fully-connected
layer. The values of hyper-parameters of their net-
work are provided in their paper. Considering the
fact that the best hyper-parameters for a neural
network depend on the datasets, we set additional
candidate values for the hyper-parameters of their
network and tune them with the validation set to
give their network more opportunities to achieve
better results. Although their model was proposed
for malware classification (i.e., to determine the mal-
ware family of a sample), we modify it to work on
malware detection by changing the dimension of the
output layer from the number of malware families to
1 and changing the output layer activation function
from softmax function to logistic regression.
For the papers in which the authors describe multiple
ways to select features and/or apply multiple machine
learning models [3], [5], we try with all possible settings and
report the best results their methods can achieve to compare
with our model.
5.3 Experiment Settings
We use two different experiment settings to evaluate our
I-MAD model and others. The main evaluation metric is
accuracy (Acc), but we also evaluate them with precision
(P), recall (R), and F1.
Table 2
Statistics of the dataset for the k-fold cross-validation experiment.
Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 Subset 4 Subset 5
Malicious 1,221 1,253 1,218 1,213 1,191
Benign 870 838 873 878 902
Total 2091 2091 2091 2091 2093
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• K-Fold Cross-Validation We first evaluate our model
and others with k-fold cross-validation where k = 5.
The original dataset is randomly split into 5 even
subsets. The statistics of the dataset is given in Ta-
ble 2. Each subset takes turns to be chosen as the test
set. One other subset takes turns to be chosen as the
validation set. The other 3 subsets form the training
set. Thus, we have 5P2 = 20 different experiment
groups. We acquire the experiment results of the 20
groups and report the averages.
• Time Split Evaluation In addition to cross-validation
evaluation, we also want to evaluate the models in a
more challenging and realistic scenario. In real life, a
malware detection system is expected to detect new
malware from the knowledge of known malware.
To evaluate this ability of the models, we follow
Saxe et al. [6] to perform a time split experiment.
There are two settings in this experiment: A) the
executables compiled between Jan. 1, 2004 and Dec.
31, 2017 form the training set and validation set and
those between Jan. 1 2018 and Dec. 31 2018 form the
test set; B) the executables compiled between Jan.
1, 2004 and Dec. 31, 2016 form the training set and
validation set and those between Jan. 1 2017 and Dec.
31 2018 form the test set. Other samples for which
the compilation dates are not within the two time
periods are not used, since they are either outdated
or the compilation dates are fake. The statistics of
the two datasets are given in Table 3. We run each
model with different initialization and random seeds
5 times and report the averages of the results.
Table 3
Statistics of the datasets for the time split experiment.
Setting A Setting B
Train Valid Test Train Valid Test
Malicious 2,286 370 629 2,069 321 925
Benign 2,649 422 141 381 66 2,798
Total 4,935 792 770 2,450 387 3,723
5.4 Results And Analysis
Table 4
Results of k-fold cross-validation experiment. It includes the p-values of
t-test for F1 and accuracy between our model and other models.
Model P R F1 P (F1) Acc P (Acc)
I-MAD (ours) 98.5 98.9 98.7 N/A 98.5 N/A
Mosk2008OpBi 98.7 98.1 98.4 5.9e-4 98.2 5.7e-4
Bald2013Meta 97.4 98.7 98.0 4.3e-8 97.7 2.7e-11
Saxe15Deep 98.4 98.4 98.4 3.5e-4 98.1 1.5e-7
Mour2019CNN 64.0 91.2 74.5 4.6e-24 63.7 1.2e-23
The results of the k-fold cross-validation and the time
split experiment are shown in Table 4 and Table 5, respec-
tively.
Our I-MAD achieves statistically significantly better F1
and accuracy than the other models in all experiments,
as the p-values in t-test are much smaller than 0.01. The
improvement of our model on accuracy and F1 are larger
in the time split experiments than in the cross-validation
experiment. Even though we make sure there is no redun-
dancy in the dataset, some malware could be extensively
similar to each other if they are from the same family and
compiled with slightly different modifications. They are
usually compiled close to each other in time in this case.
In the time split experiment, the executables in the test
set are strictly compiled later than any executable in the
training and validation sets. Thus, the larger improvement
of our detection model in that scenario indicates that it has
better abilities to learn robust and consistent patterns from
old samples that can be generalized for new samples. The
vector representation of assembly code generated by our H-
Tran and the improved way of using printable string and PE
import features are shown to be the major contributors to
the excellent performance of our model, which is illustrated
in the attribution subsection below.
That being said, other models, except Mour2019CNN,
also achieve reasonably good results in all experi-
ments. However, none of them consistently achieves the
second-best performance in all experiments. Even though
Saxe15Deep uses features from multiple scopes, they do not
show better results than Bald2013Meta and Mosk2008OpBi,
like our model. The lack of any mechanism to understand
assembly code and the less effective ways to represent
printable string and PE import features could be two major
reasons that lead to the differences on the performance.
Most models achieve higher accuracy than F1 in setting
B of the time split experiment. This is because in its test set,
the two classes of executables are not evenly distributed,
and benignware is the majority. Thus, there are many true
negative samples, i.e., benign executables correctly recog-
nized by the models, which contribute to their accuracy, but
not F1. The situation is just the opposite in setting A.
Mour2019CNN performs much worse than other models,
even though we tried alternative hyper-parameter values
for it besides the values the authors provided. It becomes
much worse when the training set is significantly smaller in
setting B of the time split experiment. We indeed observe
overfitting, as its accuracy on the training set achieves
84.9%, while on the test set it is 28.1%. Even though our
model is also a deep learning model, it does not suffer from
the overfitting problem, because we use two pre-training
tasks to adequately train the two bottom level Transformer
networks with the rich information embedded in assembly
code. In contrast, Mour2019CNN can only be trained with
the labels of executables, which is insufficient.
5.5 Attribution
Table 1 has shown how our model interpret the detection
result of a sample. It can be seen that the assembly code
of the target executable is the primary reason leading to
the prediction of the malicious class. We checked the two
assembly functions that are mainly focused on and found
that they set the program to sleep for a certain time and then
download an embedded executable from a remote address
and run it.
To better understand the impacts of the features we use,
Table 6 shows the five most frequent main factors leading
the prediction of a sample to be malware or benign.
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Table 5
Results of time split experiment. It includes the p-values of t-test for F1 and accuracy between our model and other models.
Setting A Setting B
Model P R F1 P (F1) Acc P (Acc) P R F1 P (F1) Acc P (Acc)
I-MAD (ours) 98.1 96.7 97.4 N/A 95.7 N/A 88.1 94.6 91.1 N/A 95.4 N/A
Mosk2008OpBi 98.9 86.6 92.3 4.3e-8 88.3 4.5e-8 68.6 91.4 78.3 1.9e-8 87.4 2.6e-8
Bald2013Meta 98.2 92.5 95.3 1.2e-5 92.5 1.7e-5 90.0 81.6 85.6 2.7e-4 93.2 7.8e-4
Saxe15Deep 98.2 89.5 93.6 4.1e-4 90.1 3.5e-4 69.5 94.3 80.0 3.0e-6 88.2 4.8e-6
Mour2019CNN 81.7 99.8 89.8 2.6e-11 81.5 9.7e-12 25.7 99.5 40.9 1.4e-10 28.1 2.8e-8
Table 6
Most frequent main factors that lead to the predictions of the malicious
or benign class.
Main factors leading to the prediction of the malicious class
Total number of PE imports
Number of uncommon strings
Assembly code
The import of comctl32.dll
The frequency of the string "\x05Shift\x0bTShiftState"
Main factors leading to the prediction of the benign class
Assembly code
Number of uncommon strings
The import of KERNEL32.dll
Total number of PE imports
The frequency of the string "\r\x01\x01\x01\x05"
The assembly code of an executable is one of the most
frequent factors influencing the prediction of an executable
to be malicious or benign. It means that the vector repre-
senting the semantic meaning of assembly code computed
by our H-Tran is very effective for malware detection.
Our proposed features, number of uncommon strings and
number of PE imports, are also frequent main factors for
predicting a sample to either class, which means they are
highly effective. This observation also shows the superi-
ority of our IFFNN over logistic regression: as number of
uncommon strings and number of PE imports always have
non-negative values, when each of them serves as a main
factor leading to the prediction of the malicious class, its
weight is positive (i.e., w(v)jvj > 0&vj > 0 ⇒ w(v)j > 0),
and when it serves as a main factor leading to the pre-
diction of the benign class, its weight is negative (i.e.,
w(v)jvj < 0&vj > 0 ⇒ w(v)j < 0). This cannot be
achieved by logistic regression, since when it is trained, the
weight for each feature is determined, irrelevant of the input
samples. However, the weight of each feature in IFFNN is
dynamically computed depending on the whole context, i.e.,
the vector representing all features.
We randomly examined the assembly functions of some
malware that are mainly focused on by the top layer multi-
head attention network. Many of them concern malicious
behaviors, such as installing itself into some registry, hijack-
ing some common legitimate DLL, and injection to another
process.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present I-MAD, a novel deep learning
model for static malware detection that is based on the
understanding of assembly code. In addition to its excellent
detection performance, it can also provide interpretation for
its detection results, which can be examined by malware
analysts. Therefore, in addition to being a malware detector,
it can also help malware analysts locate malicious payloads
and find consistent patterns in malware samples.
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